Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1989

Alta Ridge Associates, FMA Leasing Company v.
Citizen's Bank and Ken Baxter : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Stewart M. Hanson; Charles P. Sampson; Suitter, Axland, Armstrong & Hanson.
Donald J. Winder; Kathy A. F. Davis; Winder & Haslam.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Alta Ridge Associates, FMA Leasing Company v. Citizen's Bank and Ken Baxter, No. 890220.00 (Utah Supreme Court,
1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2596

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH SUPREME COURT

u

UTAH
D r «M«-NT

'*•

Bi.,£F

K.
45.9
.S9
D o C i O NO.

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

ALTA RIDGE ASSOCIATES and
FMA LEASING COMPANY,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. 890220

vs.

Category No. 14b

CITIZEN'S BANK and KEN BAXTER,
Defendants.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT, FMA LEASING COMPANY

APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSON
Date of Judgment March 31, 1989
Case No. C82-9240

STEWART M. HANSON, JR., Esq. (#1356)
CHARLES P. SAMPSON, Esq. (#4658)
PAUL M. SIMMONS, Esq. (#4668)
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
700 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480
Telephone: (801) 532-7300
DONALD J. WINDER, Esq. (#3519)
KATHY A.F. DAVIS, Esq. (#4022)
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668
Telephone: (801) 322-2222

FILED
ADD 1 A toon
CterK, Supreme Court, Utah

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

ALTA RIDGE ASSOCIATES and
FMA LEASING COMPANY,
Case No. 890220

Plaintiffs,

Category No. 14b

vs.
CITIZEN'S BANK and KEN BAXTER,
Defendants.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT, FMA LEASING COMPANY

APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSON
Date of Judgment March 31, 1989
Case No. C82-9240

STEWART M. HANSON, JR., Esq. (#1356)
CHARLES P. SAMPSON, Esq. (#4658)
PAUL M. SIMMONS, Esq. (#4668)
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
700 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480
Telephone: (801) 532-7300
DONALD J. WINDER, Esq. (#3519)
KATHY A.F. DAVIS, Esq. (#4022)
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668
Telephone: (801) 322-2222

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION

1

SUMMARY OF REPLY

2

ARGUMENT

2

I.

FMA'S APPEAL IS TIMELY

2

II.

FMA DID NOT BREACH ITS DEED
WARRANTIES

3

III. EVEN IF CITIZENS BANK'S CLAIM WAS
COVERED BYTHE SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED,
THE DEED WARRANTY WAS NOT BREACHED
IV.
V.

7

FIDELITY IS NOT ENTITLED TO ITS
DEFENSE COSTS FROM FMA

14

FMA'S THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT PRECLUDED
ENFORCEMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT
OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT

20

CONCLUSION

21

ADDENDUM

24

- ii -

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
paqe(s)

Arizona Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Smith. 21 Ariz. App.
371, 519 P. 2d 860 (1974)

6

Camden County Welfare Bd. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Co..
1 N.J. Super. 532, 62 A.2d 416 (1948)

12

Central Life Assur. Assoc, v. Impelmans, 13 Wash. 2d 632,
126 P.2d 757 (1942)

4, 5

Chanev v. Haeder. 90 Or. App. 321, 752 P.2d 854 (1988)

13

Chicago Mobile Dev. Co. v. G.C. Coggin Co.. 259 Ala. 152,
66 So.2d 151 (1953)
12
Christiansen v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co.. 590 P.2d 1251
(Utah 1979)
11, 12
Clover Creamery Co. v. Kanode, 142 Va. 542, 129
S.E. 222 (1925)
5
Creason v. Peterson. 24 Utah 2d 305, 470 P.2d
403 (1970)

12, 15

Double L. Properties. Inc. v. Crandall. 51 Wash. App.
149, 751 P.2d 1208 (1988)

13

East Canyon Land & Stock Co. v. Davis & Weber
Counties Canal Co.. 65 Utah 560 238 P. 280 (1925)

12

Feldman v. Urban Commercial. Inc.. 87 N.J. Super. 391,
209 A.2d 640 (1965)

6

First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. New York Title Ins. Co..
171 Misc. 854, 12 N.Y.S. 2d 703 (1939)

6

Georoe A. Lowe Co. v. Simmons Warehouse Co.. 39 Utah 395
117 P. 874 (1911)

12

McClearv v. Bratton. 307 S.W.2d 722 (Mo. App. 1957)

12

- iii -

CASES
page(s)
Nolde B r o s . . I n c . v . Chalklev. 184 Va. 553, 35 S.E.2d
827 (Va. 1945)

5

Skauae v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.. 172 Mont. 521,
565 P. 2d 628 (1977)

18

Stracka v. Peterson. 377 N.W.2d 580 n.6 (N.D. 1985)

5

The Brazil (United States v. The Brazil), 134 F.2d 929
(7th Cir. 1943)
Transainerica Title Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Wash. 2d 409,

19

693 P.2d 697 (1985)

18

United States v. Launder.

743 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1984)

6

Van Cott v. Jacklin, 63 Utah 412, 420, 226 P. 460
(1924)

14, 16

Walsh v. Dunn. 34 111. App. 146

15

Yancev v. Yancev. 230 N.C. 719, 55 S.E.2d 468 (1949)

18

STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. S 57-1-12

7

R. Utah S. Ct. 4

2, 3

Utah R. App. P. 4

3

- iv -

OTHER AUTHORITIES
Pagefs)

Black's Law Dictionary 1230 (5th ed. 1979)

17

Black's Law Dictionary 12 84 (5th ed. 1979)

5

6A. R. Powell, The Law of Real Property II 896-98

7

6A. R. Powell, The Law of Real Property II 899 & 900

7

6A R. Powell, The Law of Real Property I 900[1]

7

6A. R. Powell, The Law of Real Property I 900[2] [a]

7, 8

6A. R. Powell, The Law of Real Property I 900[2][b]

9

6A. R. Powell, The Law of Real Property I 900[2] [c]

8, 9

6A. R. Powell, The Law of Real Property I 900[2][d] . 4, 10, 11
6A. R. Powell, The Law of Real Property I 900[2] [e]

10

M. Rooney, Attorney's Guide to Title Insurance at 4-40
(1984)

18

C. Sandburg, Abraham Lincoln; The Prairie Years and the
War Years 142 (1-vol. ed. 1954)

19

W. Shakespeare, Comedy of Errors, act V, scene iii,
lines 50-57

- v -

19, 20

Appellant, FMA Leasing Company ("FMA"), by and through
its undersigned counsel of record and pursuant to rule 24 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, submits the following
brief in reply to the Brief of Respondent Fidelity National Title
Insurance Company (hereinafter Brief of Respondent).
INTRODUCTION
FMA conveyed the property that was the subject of this
action to Alta Ridge Associates ("Alta Ridge") by special warranty
deed.

When Citizens Bank asserted an interest in the property,

FMA brought this action to have Citizens Bank's claim invalidated
and title quieted in Alta Ridge.

Alta Ridge's title insurer

joined as a plaintiff, in the name of Alta Ridge (as it was entitled to do under its title insurance policy).

The plaintiffs

were successful, and title was quieted in Alta Ridge. The trial
court then granted summary judgment to Alta Ridge's title insurer, the appellee, Fidelity National Title Insurance Company
("Fidelity"), on Alta Ridge's cross-claim against FMA and awarded
Fidelity its attorney fees incurred in this action.1

1

In its Statement of the Case, Fidelity states that
the trust deed in favor of Citizens Bank's assignor, 4-Seasons,
was given by the former owner of the property, Dale Morgan, to
secure a portion of the purchase price. Mr. Morgan testified
and the jury found that Mr. Morgan did not receive any consideration for the trust deed note that he gave to 4-Seasons. Record
at 1114-15 & 843.
- 1 -

SUMMARY OF REPLY
FMA's appeal is timely because its notice of appeal
was filed within the extended time allowed by the trial court
under rule 4(e) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.

(Point

I.)
Fidelity has failed to show either that FMA warranted
against Citizens Bank's claim when it gave Alta Ridge a special
warranty deed (Point II) or, if it did, that FMA breached any
covenant stated or implied in the special warranty deed (Point
III).

Moreover, Fidelity has failed to show any basis for an

award of attorney fees under principles of subrogation.

(Point

IV.) Finally, FMA's third-party complaint against Fidelity precluded summary judgment in Fidelity's favor.

(Point V.)

ARGUMENT
I.
FMA'S APPEAL IS TIMELY.
Fidelity argues that FMA's appeal should be dismissed
because its notice of appeal was untimely.2 The order from which
FMA has appealed was entered on March 31, 1989. Record at 192931.

FMA first filed a notice of appeal on May 4, 1989. Jd. at

1932.

A notice of appeal is required to be filed within thirty

2

FMA first became aware of this argument in July 1989,
when it received a copy of this court's notice that Fidelity's
motion for summary disposition had been denied. FMA never received a copy of the motion for summary disposition.
• 2 -

days after the date of entry of the order appealed from.
Utah S. Ct. 4(a). 3

R.

FMA's notice of appeal filed on May 4, 1989,

would have been untimely.

However, the district court, "upon a

showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time
for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later than
30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by" rule
4(a).

Id. 4(e). On May 4, 1989, well within the thirty days

allowed by rule 4(e), FMA filed a motion to extend the time for
filing its notice of appeal.

Record at 1939-40.

On May 12,

1989, the trial court granted the motion, allowing FMA an additional thirty days, to May 30, 1989, to file its notice of appeal.
Record at 1949-50; see Addendum.

Fidelity did not appeal from

the trial court's order extending the time to appeal, and, on
May 26, 1989, within the extended time allowed by the trial court,
FMA filed a new notice of appeal.

See Addendum.

FMA's second

notice of appeal was clearly timely under rule 4, and this court
thus has jurisdiction to hear this appeal.
II.
FMA DID NOT BREACH ITS DEED WARRANTIES,
The central issue in this appeal is whether the trial
court erred in awarding Fidelity its attorney's fees incurred

3

FMA's notice of appeal is governed by rule 4 of the
now superseded Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. The new Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, which became effective April 1,
1990, would not change the result. See Utah R. App. P. 4.
- 3 -

in successfully defending a claim of adverse title brought against
its insured, Alta Ridge.
a subrogation claim.4

Fidelity's only claim against FMA is

Fidelity claims that it is subrogated to

the rights of its insured, Alta Ridge.

Thus, Fidelity has a

claim against FMA for its attorney's fees only if Alta Ridge
would have such a claim.

And the only basis for such a claim

that the trial court found was that FMA breached its warranties
under the Special Warranty Deed that it gave Alta Ridge.
A special warranty deed only warrants title against
certain persons or claims.

Central Life Assur. Assoc, v.

Impelmans, 13 Wash. 2d 632, 126 P.2d 757, 763 (1942).

Under

the Special Warranty Deed in this case, FMA only warranted title
"against all claiming by, through, or under it."

See Brief of

Respondent addenda at 25. Such a warranty "protects the grantee
against a claim under a title from his grantor, but not against
a claim under a title against, or superior to, his grantor."
Id. at 763 (emphasis in original).

See also 6A R. Powell, The

Law of Real Property I 900[2][d] at 81A-141 (rev. ed. 1989)
("Under a special warranty, if the claim arose under, or due to
the actions of, a prior owner of the land, the covenantor has
no liability-) (footnote omitted).

4

Fidelity does not claim that FMA owed it any duty, and,
in fact, the only relationship between FMA and Fidelity is that
FMA paid the premium for the title insurance policy that Fidelity's agent issued to Alta Ridge, FMA's grantee.
- 4 -

Citizens Bank's claim was not a claim under title from
FMA, Rather, was based upon an assignment of a trust deed given
to a third party (4-Seasons) by FMA's predecessor, Dale Morgan.
Thus, it was a claim "under a title against, or superior to,"
FMA's that "arose under . . .

a prior owner of the land," and

FMA did not warrant against it.5
Fidelity tries to avoid this difficulty by arguing
that FMA warranted against any encumbrances "suffered" by FMA
(citing Impelmans, 126 P.2d 757) and that FMA "suffered" Citizens
Bank's claim by its actions or failure to act.

This argument

must fail because there is no evidence that FMA "suffered" any
encumbrance created by the assignment from 4-Seasons to Citizens Bank.
The law is clear that one does not "suffer" matters
of which it has no knowledge.
implies knowledge.

The word "suffer" necessarily

Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Chalklev, 184 Va. 553,

35 S.E.2d 827, 832-33 (Va. 1945) (citing Clover Creamery Co. v.
Kanode, 142 Va. 542, 129 S.E. 222 (1925)); Black's Law Dictionary

5

Other courts have stated that a grantor under a special
warranty deed is only liable if the grantee's ownership "is disturbed by some claim arising through an act of the grantor."
Stracka v. Peterson, 377 N.W.2d 580, 583 n.6 (N.D. 1985) (emphasis
added). Citizens Bank's claim did not arise through any act of
FMA. Its claim arose through the acts of third parties, namely
Dale Morgan and 4-Seasons, to which FMA was not a party and of
which it had no knowledge.

- 5 .

1284 (5th ed. 1979).

See also Arizona Title Ins. & Trust Co.

v. Smith, 21 Ariz. App. 371, 519 P.2d 860, 863 (1974) ("suffered"
implies a failure to prohibit or prevent an encumbrance with
full knowledge that the encumbrance is to be created and with
the intention that it be created); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.
v. New York Title Ins. Co., 171 Misc. 854, 12 N.Y.S. 2d 703, 709
(1939) (to "suffer" an act implies the power to prohibit or prevent it and includes knowledge of what is to be done with the
intention that it be done); Feldman v. Urban Commercial, Inc.,
87 N.J. Super. 391, 209 A.2d 640, 648 (1965) (accord). Cf. United
States v. Launder,

743 F.2d 686, 689 (9th Cir. 1984) (accord,

construing criminal statute).
It is undisputed that FMA did not know about 4-Seasons ' assignment to Citizens Bank, much less that it intended
the assignment to occur.

Therefore, FMA did not "suffer" any

encumbrance created by that assignment. The only adverse interest
that FMA knew about was the trust deed to 4-Seasons, and FMA
thought it had resolved 4-Seasons' interest when 4-Seasons stipulated that the property could be sold by FMA free of 4-Seasons'
claim.
Because Citizens Bank's claim did not arise "by, through
or under" FMA nor did FMA "suffer" the claim, FMA did not warrant
against the claim and cannot be liable to Fidelity for its attorney's fees incurred in successfully challenging that claim.
- 6 -

III.
EVEN IF CITIZENS BANK'S CLAIM WAS COVERED BY THE
SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED, THE DEED WARRANTY WAS NOT BREACHED.
Even if FMA warranted against Citizens Bank's claim,
it did not breach any warranty.
Under Utah law, the grantor under a warranty deed makes
the following covenants:**
1.

Covenant of Seisin.

Courts have taken two views

as to what constitutes a breach of the covenant of seisin.

A

minority of courts hold that the covenant is breached only if
a third party is in possession at the time of the conveyance,
even if the possession is tortious. The majority of courts hold
that the covenant is also breached if the grantor does not own
the estate specified or owns it subject to a lesser estate.
See generally 6A R. Powell, supra note 6, S 900[2][a] at 81A132 & -133. There appear to be no Utah cases on point. Regardb

See Utah Code Ann. S 57-1-12. Absent a statute, the
creation of covenants is basically a matter of private contract.
What covenants are included in a deed depend on the agreement
of the parties. 6A R. Powell# The Law of Real Property I 900[1]
at 81A-131 (rev. ed. 1989). In this case, FMA did not give Alta
Ridge a statutory warranty deed but rather a special warranty
deed. Nevertheless, FMA will assume for purposes of this appeal
that the special warranty deed included the five statutory covenants with respect to any claims "by, through, or under" FMA.
The first three statutory covenants are present covenants. If breached at all, they are breached when the warranty
deed is delivered to the grantee. 2d. 15 896-98. The latter
two covenants are future covenants, meaning that they can be
breached only by some future action. See id. 11 899 & 900.

- 7 -

less of which view Utah would take, however, there was no breach
of the covenant of seisin in this case.

There was no evidence

that Citizens Bank was in possession of the property at the time
of the conveyance from FMA to Alta Ridge, and, in fact, Alta
Ridge has been in possession of the property from the time of
the conveyance to the present. Moreover, FMA in fact owned the
estate that it conveyed, and the property was not subject to a
lesser estate.

Citizens Bank's claim based on an assignment of

a trust deed was at best only a lien or encumbrance.

See id. S

900[2][c] at 81A-136 ("a mortgage lien is an encumbrance since
it does not deny the passage of the seisin from the grantor to
the grantee").

And "the fact that the estate is subject to an

encumbrance . . . is not a breach of the covenant [of seisin]."
Id. f 900[2] [a] at 81A-133 (footnote omitted). Moreover, Citizens
Bank's claim was not even an encumbrance on the property. Citizens Bank's claim was only as good as its assignor's, and the
jury found that the trust deed from Dale Morgan to 4-Seasons,
Citizens Bank's assignor, failed for lack of consideration.
See Record at 843.
2.

Covenant of Right to Convey,

The covenant of

right to convey is a covenant that the grantor has the right to
convey the property.

It is coextensive with the covenant of

seisin in those jurisdictions following the majority view of
that covenant. It is breached by the existence of an outstanding
- 8 -

paramount title at the time of conveyance.
supra note 6, I 900[2][b].

See 6A R. Powell,

It is undisputed in this case that

FMA had the right to convey the property to Alta Ridge and that
Citizens Bank had no title or interest in the property.

Thus,

there was no breach of the covenant of right to convey.
3.

Covenant Against

Encumbrances.

The covenant

against encumbrances warrants that the premises are free from
encumbrances and that the grantor will indemnify the grantee if
he or she suffers any loss to the value of the premises due to
the existence of an encumbrance.
(citation omitted).

Id., f 900[2][c] at 81A-135

A mortgage lien is an encumbrance, and the

existence of such a lien would violate the covenant.

However,

a lien "is a claim which is enforceable against the land if the
obligation which it secures is not otherwise paid."
137.

Ici. at 81A-

There was no lien in this case because Citizens Bank's

claim against the land was unenforceable*

Where an encumbrance

is unenforceable or one is successful in defending an action to
enforce the encumbrance, no violation of the covenant occurs.
Id. at 81A-138 & -139 (footnote omitted).

Because FMA was suc-

cessful in defeating Citizen Bank's claimed encumbrance, there
was no violation of the covenant against encumbrances,
4.

Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment.

The covenant of

quiet enjoyment assures the grantee that his or her quiet
possession or enjoyment of the property will not be disturbed
- 9 -

by the grantor or anyone else with paramount title.

Id. f 900

[2][e] at 81A-144. The covenant is breached by any interference
with the grantee's title or usage of the property by one having
paramount title.

Because Citizen Bank had no interest in the

property, there was no interference with Alta Ridge's possession
or enjoyment of the property by one having paramount title and
thus no breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment.
5.

Covenant of Warranty. *?

Under the covenant of

warranty, the grantor agrees to compensate the grantee for any
loss that the grantee sustains by reason of a failure of the
title or an encumbrance thereon and agrees to defend the title
"against the lawful claims which may be asserted against it."
Id. I 900[2][d] at 81A-139 (emphasis added and footnote omitted).
Because Citizens Bank did not have a lawful, valid claim against
the property, there was no breach of the covenant to warrant
and defend title. In fact, FMA did defend title. It filed this
action to enjoin Citizens Bank's wrongful, nonjudicial foreclosure
and to quiet title in Alta Ridge, and it incurred substantial
attorney's fees in the process.
A breach of the covenant of warranty occurs "when,
and only when, the grantee suffers an eviction under a paramount

7

The covenant of warranty and the covenant of quiet
enjoyment are "fraternal, if not identical, twin[s]."
6A R.
Powell, supra note 6, I 900[2][d] at 81A-144. A breach of one
generally constitutes a breach of the other.
- 10 -

title."

Id., at 81A-142 (footnote omitted). Accord Christiansen

v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 590 P.2d 1251, 1253 (Utah 1979) (to
recover for a breach of covenant of warranty or a covenant against
encumbrances, "the complaining party must show that he was evicted
by one having the paramount title") (footnote omitted).

The

eviction may be either actual or constructive. 590 P.2d at 1253.
An actual eviction occurs when an adverse party removes
the grantee from possession or is already in possession on the
date that the grantee acquires title to the property.

6A R.

Powell, supra note 6, I 900[2][d] at 81A-143. Fidelity does not
contend that Alta Ridge was actually evicted from the property.
See Brief of Respondent at 16-19.

Rather, Fidelity argues that

Citizens Bank's foreclosure action constituted a constructive
eviction of Alta Ridge.

"A constructive eviction occurs when

there is a positive assertion of a paramount title and the grantee
rightfully yields to the holder of that title," even without an
actual surrender of the premises.

.Ici.

" [U]nless there is a

disturbance of the grantee's title, or the threat of a disturbance, by the holder of paramount title. there can be no eviction,"

£d. (footnote omitted and emphasis added).

Christiansen. 590 P.2d at 1253.

See also

There was no eviction—either

actual or constructive--in this case because Citizens Bank did
not hold paramount title. In fact, it did not have any interest
at all in the property.
- 11 -

In short, FMA did not breach any deed warranty, and
the trial court erred in concluding that it had.
None of the cases cited by Fidelity alters this conclusion.

In each of those cases, the encumbrance either had

been held valid, or

its validity was not contested.

See

Christiansen v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 590 P.2d 1251, 1253 (Utah
1979) (no question regarding the validity of the encumbrance
though there was a fact question regarding its abandonment);
Creason v. Peterson, 24 Utah 2d 305, 470 P.2d 403, 405 (1970)
(finding that there was at least "a technical defect" in the
title); East Canyon Land & Stock Co* v. Davis & Weber Counties
Canal Co. . 65 Utah 560, 566, 238 P. 280 (1925) (the court assumed
that paramount title was in the United States); George A. Lowe
Co. v. Simmons Warehouse Co., 39 Utah 395, 398, 117 P. 874 (1911)
(holding that a claimed tax lien constituted a valid encumbrance);
Chicago Mobile Dev. Co. v. G.C. Cooain Co., 259 Ala. 152, 66
So.2d 151, 155 (1953); Camden County Welfare Bd. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Co., 1 N.J. Super. 532, 62 A.2d 416, 422, 424 (1948);
McCleary v. Bratton, 307 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Mo. App. 1957) (grantee
unsuccessful in title defense). In this case, on the other hand,
it is beyond dispute that Citizens Bank did not have a valid claim
to the property. Therefore, Citizens Bank's claim did not breach

- 12 -

any of FMA's deed warranties, even assuming that that claim came
within FMA's warranties under the Special Warranty Deed.8
Finally, Fidelity argues that the law ought to allow
a grantee's insurer to recover the costs of a successful defense
because otherwise a grantor would simply refuse to defend an
action, gambling that his grantee would ultimately prevail.^
Regardless of the merits of Fidelity's policy argument, the argument is inapplicable in this case because FMA did not refuse to
defend Alta Ridge's title but filed this action challenging Citizens Bank's claim and incurred substantial costs as a result.
Because Fidelity's argument is inapplicable under the facts of
this case, the court need not consider it.

8
Interestingly, while all of the cases Fidelity cites
are distinguishable, Fidelity does not even mention, let alone
distinguish, the authorities FMA has cited to show that, absent
an eviction, deed warranties are not breached by a successful
defense of a third party's claim. See, e.g., Chaney v. Haeder.
90 Or. App. 321, 752 P.2d 854 (1988); Double L. Properties. Inc.
v. Crandall, 51 Wash. App. 149, 751 P.2d 1208 (1988).
9
The same policy concerns militate against Fidelity's
position. If a title insurer were entitled to recover its attorney's fees from its insured's grantor even where, as here, the
grantor successfully defends its grantee's title, the title insurer would have no incentive to search or defend title where
it was dealing with a solvent grantor.
- 13 -

IV.
FIDELITY IS NOT ENTITLED TO ITS DEFENSE COSTS FROM FMA.
The basis for the trial court's award of attorney's
fees to Fidelity (as opposed to Alta Ridge) was that Fidelity
was subrogated to Alta Ridge's rights against FMA.

Thus, the

court must first determine whether Alta Ridge had any right to
recover its attorney's fees from FMA.
The only basis that the trial court found for an award
of attorney's fees was FMA's alleged breach of its deed warranties.

For the reasons stated in point III, supra, FMA did not

breach any deed warranty.

But even if FMA had breached a deed

covenant, under Utah law Alta Ridge would not be entitled to
recover its attorney's fees.
Where there is a breach of a deed covenant, the grantee
is entitled to recover his "costs" incurred as a result of the
breach.

Van Cott v. Jacklin, 63 Utah 412, 419, 226 P. 460

(1924).

However, the authorities are "in hopeless conflict upon

the question of when and upon what conditions a covenantee may
recover attorney fees against his vendor.M

Id. at 420.

In Van

Cott, the Utah Supreme Court followed those decisions that allow
a covenantee to recover attorney fees "where the covenantee in
good faith and after notice to his grantor . . . [and] upon
neglect and refusal of his grantor to put him in possession,
. . . institute!s] proceedings to obtain such possession . . ."
- 14 -

.M 63 Utah at 421 (quoting Walsh v. Dunn. 34 111. App. 146) (emphasis added).

See also Creason v. Peterson, 24 Utah 2d 305,

470 P.2d 403, 403, 405-06 (1970) (allowing a grantee to recover
attorney fees incurred as a result of his grantor's breach of
deed warranties where the grantor failed to cure the title defect).

Here, however, when FMA was notified of Citizens Bank's

claim, it undertook to prosecute an action to quiet title in
its grantee, Alta Ridge, and incurred substantial attorney's
fees as a result.

The fact that Fidelity joined in the action

and also incurred attorney's fees does not give rise to any claim
by Alta Ridge against FMA.

Rather, Fidelity incurred its fees

as a result of its efforts to fulfill its own, independent obligation to its insured, Alta Ridge, under the terms of its title
insurance policy.

The fact that both Fidelity and FMA may have

had independent obligations to defend Alta Ridge's title simply
means that Alta Ridge was doubly protected, and the fact that
both fulfilled any obligation they may have had to Alta Ridge
shows that Alta Ridge in fact suffered no damage as a result of
FMA's actions or inaction and thus has no claim against FMA to
which Fidelity could be subrogated.
Moreover, Alta Ridge's cross-claim only sought judgment
against FMA "in the event Citizens is awarded judgment or allowed
. . . to proceed with sale of the Property."

Record at 268.

It is undisputed that Citizens Bank was neither awarded judgment
- 15 -

nor allowed to proceed with its sale of the Property.

Thus,

there was no basis in the pleadings for any judgment against
FMA on Alta Ridge's cross-claim.
Finally, Alta Ridge could only recover attorney fees
if it had paid them or had become legally obligated to pay them.
Van Cott v. Jacklin, 63 Utah 412, 420, 226 P. 460 (1924).

It

is undisputed that Alta Ridge did not pay any attorney fees.
See Brief of Respondent at 24 & n.4. Moreover, under the terms
of its title insurance policy, Fidelity—not Alta Ridge—was
legally obligated to pay for the defense of Alta Ridge's title.
The policy states: "The Company [Fidelity] shall have the right
at its own cost to institute and . . . prosecute any action or
proceeding or to do any other act which in its opinion may be
necessary or desirable to establish the title to the estate or
interest as insured

. . . ."

Brief of Respondent addenda

at 29 f 3(c) (emphasis added). The policy further provides: "In
all cases where this policy permits or requires the Company
[Fidelity] to prosecute . . . any action or proceeding, the insured hereunder [Alta Ridge] . • • shall give the Company all
reasonable aid in any such action or proceeding . . . , and the
Company shall reimburse such insured for any expense so incurred."
Id. f 3(e) (emphasis added).

Thus, under the very terms of its

own title insurance policy, Fidelity—not Alta Ridge—was legally
obligated to pay the costs it incurred in this action.
- 16 -

Because

Alta Ridge did not have any obligation to pay Fidelity's attorney
fees incurred in this action, Fidelity did not discharge any
debt owed by Alta Ridge and, under principles of subrogation,
is not entitled to recover its attorney fees from FMA.
Fidelity apparently concedes that it is not equitably
subrogated to any right of Alta Ridge to recover its attorney's
fees from FMA. See Brief of Respondent at 22. Instead, it argues
that it is subrogated to the rights of Alta Ridge under the express terms of the title insurance policy, which states:
Whenever [Fidelity] shall have settled a
claim under this policy, all right of subrogation shall vest in [Fidelity] unaffected
by any act of the insured claimant [Alta
Ridge]. [Fidelity] shall be subrogated to
and be entitled to all rights and remedies
which such insured claimant would have had
against any person or property in respect
to such claim had this policy not been issued
.

See

. . .

Brief of Respondent addenda at 35 I 11.
Fidelity's contractual right of subrogation is limited

to claims that Fidelity has "settled" under its policy of title
insurance. The meaning of the word "settle" depends on the context.

Black's Law Dictionary 1230 (5th ed. 1979).

Fidelity's

title insurance policy was a standard American Land Title Association (ALTA) owner's policy.
at 28.

See Brief of Respondent addenda

Commenting on paragraph 11 (the subrogation provision)

of such policies, one commentator has stated that the insurer
is subrogated to the rights of the insured "in the event the
- 17 -

insurer makes a payment in satisfaction of a claim under the
policy."

M. Rooney, Attorney's Guide to Title Insurance at 4-

40 (1984) (emphasis added).

Fidelity did not make any payment

in satisfaction of any claim of Alta Ridge.

Thus, Fidelity did

not "settle" any claim and is not subrogated under the policy
to any rights of Alta Ridge, even if Alta Ridge did have some
right to recover attorney's fees from FMA.
Fidelity argues that, by preventing the foreclosure
of Citizens Bank and obtaining a final determination that Citizens
Bank's claim was invalid, Fidelity "settled" that claim within
the meaning of the policy.

However, it cites no authority for

this proposition, and in all of the cases cited by Fidelity in
which a right of subrogation was recognized, the insurer in fact
paid off a lien against the property or a claim against its insured (as opposed to defeating a lien or successfully defending
such a claim).

See Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 103

Wash. 2d 409, 693 P.2d 697, 698 (1985); Skaucre v. Mountain States
Tel. & Tel. Co., 172 Mont. 521, 565 P.2d 628, 629 (1977).
For its argument, Fidelity relies on two cases, neither
of which involved insurance and neither of which is on point.
The issue in Yancev v. Yancev, 230 N.C. 719, 55 S.E.2d 468 (1949),
was whether a judgment entered after a settlement was a determination on the merits.
at 470.

The court held that it was.

55 S.E.2d

It is one thing to say that a judgment based on a set- 18 -

tlement is a decision on the merits.

It is quite another to

say that all decisions on the merits are the settlement of a
claim.10

In the second case, The Brazil (United States v. The

Brazil^, 134 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1943), the issue was whether a
libel was barred by the statute of limitations.

The statute

under which the government proceeded in filing the libel provided
that all forfeitures could be "disposed of" in the same manner
as forfeitures in actions to collect a duty.

The court stated,

"'To dispose' of a matter is to arrange or settle it finally;
to determine the fate or fix the condition of; to finish with;
to adjust, settle and determine a matter."

134 F.2d at 931.

The court held that the statute prescribing the manner of disposition of a statutory right to forfeiture also prescribed when
the cause of action accrued.

Id.

Fidelity's argument—namely,

that an insurer "settles" a case whenever the case is "disposed
of"—stretches the policy language beyond the breaking point.11
10

As Lincoln noted, by such an argument one could "prove
a horse chestnut to be a chestnut horse.H C. Sandburg, Abraham
Lincoln: The Prairie Years and the War Years 142 (1-vol. ed.
1954) .
11

Fidelity's argument from synonyms for words taken out
of context is reminiscent of Dromio of Syracuse's argument for
why light wenches burn. Speaking of a courtesan, he said:
[S]he is the devil's dam, and here she comes
in the habit of a light wench; and thereof
comes that the wenches say, "God damn me;"
that's as much as to say, "God make me a
light wench."
It is written, they appear
to men like angels of light: light is an
- 19 -

Fidelity's argument would allow an insurer to recover its attorney's fees even where the disposition of the case was against
the insurer, for example, where the case was dismissed (i.e.,
"disposed of") for the insurer's failure to prosecute.
In short, Fidelity's subrogation argument is not supported by either the plain language of the policy or common sense.
But even if Fidelity were subrogated to the rights of its insured
under the policy, it is clear that Alta Ridge had no claim against
FMA for attorney's fees.
V.
FMA'S THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT PRECLUDED ENFORECMENT
OF THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Fidelity argues that FMA's third-party complaint does
not preclude enforcement of the trial court's order because FMA's
damages, if any, are unliquidated and because Fidelity should not
be required to wait indefinitely for the enforcement of its judgment.
FMA's

third-party

complaint

sought

indemnification

from Fidelity in the event the court found FMA liable and sought
its costs of suit incurred in this action.

Record at 354. Be-

cause FMA'8 defense of Alta Ridge's title was successful, FMA's

effect of fire, and fire will burn; ergo,
light wenches will burn.
W. Shakespeare, Comedy of Errors, act V, scene iii, lines 5057.
- 20 -

only damages are the attorney's fees awarded to Fidelity and
FMA's own fees incurred herein. The former amount is liquidated,
and, if FMA is successful on its third-party complaint, that
amount will completely offset Fidelity's award of damages.
In the interest of equity, the trial court should have
adjudicated FMA's and Fidelity's respective rights in one proceeding. Although FMA's third-party complaint was filed in December 1983, FMA was not damaged until the trial court entered its
order awarding Fidelity its attorney's fees, on March 31, 1989.
To have postponed execution of Fidelity's summary judgment to
allow FMA to litigate the question of any offset would not have
unreasonably delayed enforcement of Fidelity's judgment.

On

the other hand, by not postponing execution of that judgment,
FMA could be required to pay an obligation that may be more than
offset by FMA's recovery under its third-party complaint.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court erred in
concluding that Fidelity could recover its attorney fees from
FMA. As Fidelity notes, "the law ought not to fail in dispensing
justice" (lex deficere non potest in iustitia exhibenda). Brief
of Respondent at 20. Where both the grantor and the title insurer
have an independent obligation to defend the title of their
grantee and insured, respectively, and both incur attorney fees
in successfully fulfilling their obligations, the just result
- 21 -

under long-standing principles of American law would be to let
each bear its own attorney's fees.

By requiring FMA to pay

Fidelity's attorney's fees as well as its own, the trial court
failed in dispensing justice, and its order should be reversed.
DATED this \&^ day of April, 1990.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ALTA RIDGE ASSOCIATES and
FMA LEASING COMPANY,
1

O R D E R

Plaintiffs,
vs.
CITIZENS BANK and KEN BAXTER,

'

Defendants.
*

Civil No. C82-9240

I

Honorable Timothy R. Hanson

FMA LEASING COMPANY,
Third-Party
Plaintiff,

\

vs.
ALTA TITLE COMPANY and FIDELITY
NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Third-Party
Defendants.

Based upon the Motion of FMA Leasing Company and good
cause appearing, it is hereby

1H1

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that, PMA's time for filing
its Notice of Appeal is extended from May 1/ 1989, to May 30, 1989.
DATED this __/V^day of May, *989.

I0R0RABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSON
District Judge
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700 Clark Learning Office Center
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Telephone: (801) 532-7300
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ALTA RIDGE ASSOCIATES and
FMA LEASING COMPANY,
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Plaintiffs,

vs.
CITIZENS BANK and KEN BAXTER,
Defendants.
Civil No. C82-9240
FMA LEASING COMPANY,
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson
Third-Party
Plaintiff,

vs.
ALTA TITLE COMPANY and FIDELITY
NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Third-Party
Defendants.

FMA Leasing Company, by and through its counsel of record,
Suitter Axland Armstrong & Hanson, hereby gives notice of its appeal

of the Order of the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson of the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Dtah#
awarding Alta Ridge Associates judgment against FMA in the amount
of $50,022.15 . This appeal is taken to the Utah Supreme Court,
and is filed pursuant to the Order extending the time to file appeal
to May 30, 1989, which was entered by Judge Hanson on May 12, 1989
DATED this At*** day of May, 1989.
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